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This Essay is a brief commentary on Patricia E. Salkin and Charles 
Gottlieb’s Article, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the Grass-
roots: Prioritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the 
Local Government Level.1  I focus here, as Salkin does,2 not on the 
causes of the present fiscal crises faced by a growing number of states 
and local governments, but on whether a solution to those financial 
crises might be found at the grassroots level by engaging citizens in a 
participatory democratic process. 
 
* Julie M. Cheslik is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri-
Kansas City School of Law and the Editor of The Urban Lawyer. This Essay summa-
rizes comments given at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloqui-
um, Big Problems, Small Government: Assessing the Recent Financial Crisis’ Impact 
on Municipalities, on November 11, 2011, in response to Patricia E. Salkin and 
Charles Gottlieb’s Article, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at the Grassroots: Pri-
oritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local Government Level. 
 1. Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy at 
the Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the Local 
Government Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727 (2012). 
 2. See id. at 755–83 (discussing methods of deliberative democracy).  I will refer 
to the Article as Salkin’s throughout this Essay for ease of reference. 
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I will make three arguments, detailed in the sections that follow, in 
response to Professor Salkin’s intriguing premise that engaging citi-
zens in a grassroots, deliberative, democratic process can lead us out 
of our fiscal crisis. Generally, there is much to like about deliberative 
grassroots democracy as a solution to any problem, fiscal or other.  In 
fact, it is the American way.  But I am not equally enthusiastic about 
every method of grassroots democracy promulgated as a solution to a 
fiscal crisis. In fact, there is much evidence that some methods of 
grassroots democracy are actually harmful to sound government deci-
sion-making, particularly fiscal decision-making. 
First, voter education is necessary for a successful experience in de-
liberative democracy.  Salkin’s Article shows us that involved citizens 
can and do have transformative personal experiences as a result of 
participating in a deliberative, grassroots, democratic process in which 
they are asked to provide specific solutions or make difficult decisions 
to resolve problems facing government.  In some cases, citizens per-
sonally transform from a “read my lips: no new taxes”3 mindset to 
embrace a more Holmesian4 notion that some things are simply worth 
paying for.5  This suggests that voter education is an important part of 
deliberative democracy. 
Second, Salkin is quite correct to note that improvements to the 
present methods of citizen participation in fiscal matters of local gov-
ernment are warranted.6  The present methods of citizen participation 
in addressing the major issues facing local government are inadequate 
in several respects, not the least of which is that they are often ill-
timed and lacking in dialogue. 
Third, at risk of sounding undemocratic, I challenge the notion that 
more democratic process and participation at the grassroots level 
leads to better decisions or even better decision-making processes 
than representative democracy.  There is plenty of evidence that 
 
 3. The line was famously spoken by President George H.W. Bush in 1988 as he 
accepted his party’s presidential nomination. See Top 10 Unfortunate Political One-
Liners, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1859513_ 
1859526_1859516,00.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  The words came back to haunt 
him when, “[a]s presidents sometimes must, Bush raised taxes. His words were used 
against him by then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton in a devastating attack ad dur-
ing the 1992 presidential campaign.” Id. 
 4. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated that taxes are the price we 
pay for living in civil society. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 71 (2d ed. 1961) (quoting Holmes saying: “I like to pay taxes.  
With them I buy civilization.”).  
 5. See infra p. 637 & n.64. 
 6. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 755.  
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more democracy is not necessarily better and that more grassroots 
participation does not necessarily lead to better or even different out-
comes.  In fact, one might even suggest that the most direct forms of 
democracy in use in the United States today—the initiative and the 
referendum—are complicit in causing or at least contributing to the 
fiscal crises.7  We have long relied on the public hearing and the ballot 
box as the predominant or only methods of public participation in the 
political process.  Both methods have proven frustrating and of lim-
ited value, particularly in fiscal matters where they occur too late in 
the process to help local governments which are then blindsided by 
the decisions of a public whose desires they have misread. 
I.  CITIZENS ARE PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN FISCAL DECISION-
MAKING IN CHAOTIC AND ILL-TIMED WAYS 
Local governments should improve public participation in fiscal de-
liberative democracy if for no other reason than to cease being sur-
prised and fiscally devastated by the electorate’s decision-making at 
the ballot box.  While it is sometimes the case that ballot box 
measures are the cause of the government’s fiscal distress, it is the el-
ement of having to react to these measures, often in a defensive pos-
ture, that places state and local governments in difficult positions.  
State and local governments lurch from election to election wherein 
the voters deliver surprising and often inconsistent fiscal decisions.  
Several of Salkin’s suggestions, particularly the deliberative polling 
process, can be effective in assisting local governments to better un-
derstand the electorate and to be proactive in fiscal decision-making 
to stave off the ballot box measures that contribute to the fiscal crises 
of local governments.8 
A 2011 ballot measure in Missouri provides a recent example of a 
local government on the defensive and at risk of ballot box budgeting 
that threatens dramatic fiscal problems for the local government.  In 
April 2011, residents of both Kansas City, Missouri and St. Louis, 
Missouri, the two largest metropolitan areas of the state, voted over-
whelmingly to retain a one percent earnings tax,9 passing on a signifi-
cant tax cut opportunity and allowing the local governments to retain 
a significant source of revenue.  The tax provides 40% of Kansas City, 
 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 771. 
 9. See, e.g., Jim Salter, Voters in St. Louis, KC Agree to Keep Earnings Tax, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2011), www.businessweek.com/ap/financial 
news/D9MDU2C00.htm. 
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Missouri’s budget and one-third of St. Louis’ budget.10  The decision 
to retain the tax passed by a three-to-one margin in Kansas City and, 
in St. Louis, 88% of voters opted to retain the tax.11 
The important point to consider in this tale is not that the local 
governments dodged a bullet in retaining an important source of rev-
enue, but to explore the reason the Kansas City and St. Louis voters 
were considering retention of the local earnings tax in the first place.  
In the prior election of November 2010, a statewide ballot initiative, 
Proposition A, was adopted, which prohibits any new local earnings 
taxes and requires existing earnings taxes to come up for a vote every 
five years.12  Thus, between the two elections, the local governments 
and their supporters were essentially doing damage control: challeng-
ing the legality of Proposition A, speaking out in favor of the reten-
tion of the earnings tax, and raising money to educate residents as to 
the dire fiscal consequences that would result from the loss of the 
earnings tax as a source of revenue.13 
There are other reasons for local governments to engage in delib-
erative democracy with citizens.  It is extremely difficult to predict 
voter outcomes in the current anti-tax, anti-government political cli-
mate.  More dialogue with citizens creates improved opportunities for 
education as to local government needs.  That education is presently 
provided as part of the political process, which is heavily influenced 
by special interest groups and produces erratic, if not illogical, results. 
In the November 2011 elections in the Kansas City metropolitan 
area, for example, 70% of Jackson County, Missouri voters and a ma-
jority of Clay County, Missouri voters approved a one-eighth cent 
sales tax to create a regional zoo district.14  Some of these voters ap-
proved the sales tax for the Kansas City zoo while turning down a 
school levy.15 One should not be surprised at the vagaries of local, fis-
cal decision-making by voters.  In 2008, in the height of a fiscal crisis 
 
 10. See id.  
 11. See id. 
 12. See 2010 Ballot Measures, MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE, ROBIN 
CARNAHAN, http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2010ballot/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 13. Such damage control is costly in terms of time, energy, and money.  Both cit-
ies launched campaigns with civic supporters raising funds to educate voters on the 
impact of the loss of the earnings tax.  The city attorney of Kansas City filed a lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of Proposition A. See, e.g., Steve Bell, City Files Suit 
to Stop E-Tax Vote, KCUR (Aug. 14, 2010, 2:22 AM), http://kcur.org/post/city-files-
suit-stop-e-tax-vote. 
 14. Matt Campbell, A Big Thumbs-Up, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 9, 2011, at A1, 
A15. 
 15. Id. at A15. 
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that is ongoing, Detroit area voters in three separate counties ap-
proved taxes (including a property tax increase) for their zoo.16  
While approving of zoos, voters in the Midwest are gearing up to re-
peal their state income taxes.17 
The point is not that animals are reliably supported by local voters 
while school children are not, but rather that there is a significant lack 
of appreciation by local government leaders of the preferences and 
mood of the public.  Learning those preferences only after the votes 
are tallied is no way to run a fiscal enterprise.  Salkin’s Article intro-
duces us to a variety of methods whereby local governments can be 
informed about public preferences and priorities in the budgetary 
process and, perhaps more importantly, the public can be educated 
about the tough task state and local governments face in budgeting 
and prioritizing among a great number of unmet needs. 
II.  CHALLENGING DIRECT DEMOCRACY AS A VIABLE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR MUNICIPAL FISCAL DECISION-MAKING: CAN 
THERE BE TOO MUCH DEMOCRACY? 
Salkin’s Article argues that deliberative democracy or participatory 
government should be explored as an alternative to representative 
democracy to enable “the public to provide meaningful input and ar-
ticulate preferences and priorities when it comes to the allocation of 
limited dollars to support local government service delivery.”18  At its 
heart, the Article expresses a preference for direct democracy over 
representative democracy in solving the fiscal crises facing local and 
state governments. 
Presumably, one of the primary goals to be achieved by more di-
rect, grassroots democracy in addressing fiscal crises is to arrive at 
better, or at least different, solutions to the problem.  In addition, par-
ticipation by the citizenry can be an end in itself in that “being heard” 
makes citizens happier and builds a better community.19  As one con-
 
 16. Matt Campbell, Zoo Tax a Hard Sell, But Not Impossible, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, Nov. 1, 2011, at A8. 
 17. See, e.g., The Heartland Tax Rebellion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2012, at A14. 
 18. Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 755. 
 19. Democratic participation is widely accepted as a good of local government. 
See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 32 (1963) (describing the content of 
freedom as “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm”).  Oth-
ers have extolled the virtues of yet more local or lower level, sub-local government as 
an access point for citizen participation. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the 
‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 1303, 1313–16 (1994) (describing and summarizing this argument); Heather K. 
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siders the arguments for greater citizen participation in solving the 
complex fiscal milieu in which local and state governments find them-
selves, one should consider whether in fact these are the types of cri-
ses that are alleviated by more grassroots input.  Without putting too 
fine a point on it, it is worth asking whether there are better and 
worse methods of grassroots participation, given the goal of solving a 
complex problem or, at minimum, educating citizens about the com-
plexities of fiscal problems. 
In assessing the various methods described by Salkin—the initia-
tive and referendum, the town hall meeting, participatory budgeting, 
deliberative polling, consensus conferences, and citizen juries—direct 
democracy that is “vote centric”20 likely provides no better solutions 
to fiscal problems than those proffered by elected representatives.  
“Talk centric”21 methods of engaging the citizenry to solve a fiscal cri-
sis may also result in no better solutions, but these methods can 
achieve those positive externalities that education and participation 
bring without creating up or down votes that bind government. 
A. The Most Direct Democracy Is the Worst for Solving Fiscal 
Crises: Initiative and Referendum 
There is an appeal to the argument that more, and more direct, 
democracy is better for solving the problems facing governments to-
day, and it might seem undemocratic or un-American to suggest that 
there is any debate as to whether more democracy and more grass-
roots democracy at the local level is always better.  Yet, there can be 
too much of a good thing, and too much grassroots democratic gov-
ernance at the local level has its critics.  Indeed, two camps have 
emerged in the discussion about whether it is true that if a little de-
mocracy and grassroots decision-making is good, then more must be 
better.22  Among those who make studying city governance their life’s 
 
Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–12 
(2010) (advocating sublocal units as avenues for participation by voices often un-
heard in state and local government to create local majorities).  
 20. See Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 307, 308 (2003) (describing voting-centric democracy and talk-centric democra-
cy).  
 21. See id. 
 22. Compare ARENDT, supra note 19, and Gerken, supra note 19, with Nadav 
Shoked, Micro-Localism: The Realities, Benefits, and Pitfalls of Law Going Smaller 
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with author) (questioning whether micro-local govern-
ment reforms, which include direct democracy, can be normatively justified on the 
typical grounds of efficiency, participation, and community building on which they 
are promoted). 
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work, there are some calling for “federalism-all-the-way-down” to the 
local level,23 while others point to disadvantages of more direct de-
mocracy,24 or at least see that its benefits may be overstated.25 
In his Paper The Architecture of Governance, Professor Gerald 
Frug cautions that “belief in democracy is decreasing around the 
world,” particularly, it seems, in the most democratic countries.26  
And why would that not be the case given that governing, even (or 
maybe especially) at the local level, can be fraught with delay, ineffi-
ciency, and conflict arising from interest group politics?  As evidence 
of the declining appeal of democracy as a form of city governance, 
Frug notes the current appeal of authoritarianism (“In China, they 
can really get things done”), and privatization (efforts to reduce or 
limit the role of government in favor of private or quasi-independent 
actors) in defining the role of democracy in city governance.27 
While Frug is critical of the turn away from democracy both be-
cause of the weaknesses of authoritarianism and the fragmentation 
that results from privatization,28 one of his critiques rests on the frag-
mentation of democratic decision-making that results from too much 
direct democracy.29  To see the hazards of too much direct democra-
cy, one need look no further than the modern paradigms of direct 
democracy, the initiative and the referenda, and the havoc wreaked in 
their wake in states like California30 and Oregon.31  In California, 
 
 23. Gerken, supra note 19, at 44–73.  
 24. See Gerald Frug, The Architecture of Governance, UT Law FACULTY COL-
LOQUIA 6–8 (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2011 
-2012/10-06-11_Frug_The%20Architecture%20of%20Governance.pdf. 
 25. See, e.g., Shoked, supra note 22 (manuscript at 35). 
 26. Frug, supra note 24, at 2. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. at 3. 
 29. See id.  It is ironic indeed that one of the negative consequences of too much 
direct democracy is a desire to give up on democracy altogether—not unlike a child 
who, after over-indulging in sweets, swears them off entirely. 
 30. See, e.g., Jessica A. Levinson & Robert M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in 
California: The Bane of the Golden State or an Over-Stated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 689, 697–98 (2010) (suggesting the initiative process is partially respon-
sible for the current fiscal crisis in California); Frug, supra note 24, at 6. 
 31. Some recent ballot measures in Oregon demonstrate the problems with voter 
initiatives and the complex legislative and judicial processes needed to correct them.  
In 2004, Oregon voters adopted Ballot Measure 37, which required either payment of 
“just compensation” to landowners whose real property values were reduced as a re-
sult of land-use regulations, or a waiver of the regulations, even if the regulations did 
not qualify as a taking.  Measure 37 was originally codified as OR. REV. STAT. § 
197.352 (2005) but was renamed OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 in 2007.  Also in 2007, the 
state legislature referred Measure 49 to the voters to reduce and otherwise modify 
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Frug notes, the initiative and referenda have caused or contributed to 
the fiscal problems facing state and local governments.32 
For thirty years, popular votes have controlled significant parts of 
the government agenda.  They have, for example, limited the gov-
ernment’s ability to raise revenue and, at the same time, mandated 
that it spend money for specific public purposes.  It is no surprise 
that this simultaneous limit on income and mandate of expenses has 
created paralysis.  YOU couldn’t operate a business or your own life 
if you couldn’t balance income and expenses.33 
Thus, rather than viewing direct democracy as a solution to fiscal cri-
ses, one might argue that direct or grassroots democracy, at least as 
exemplified in its purest form via the initiative and referendum, is a 
cause of fiscal crises facing government.34 
There are several factors that make the initiative and the referen-
dum particularly poor tools for sound government decision-making: 
they are up or down votes and not part of a deliberative process that 
can lead to negotiation, amendment, and the exchange of infor-
mation; they can be hijacked by special interest groups who often 
both draft the language and finance a political campaign to support 
passage; and they are the result of a secret ballot and therefore, un-
like elected officials voting in a representative democracy, the voter is 
not accountable to others for his vote.  In their Article advocating 
more direct and grassroots democracy, Salkin and Gottlieb note these 
limitations of the initiative and the referendum and the inherent lack 
of opportunities for deliberation.35 
 
the remedies available under Ballot Measure 37. See generally Edward J. Sullivan & 
Jennifer M. Brager, The Augean Stable: Measure 49 and the Herculean Task of Cor-
rection an Improvident Initiative Measure in Oregon, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 577 
(2010).  Ballot Measure 49 also passed and has been codified as OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
195.300–195.336 (2007).  Measure 49 was then challenged on various constitutional 
grounds.  On January 12, 2012, in Bowers v. Whitman, 664 F.3d 1321, 1329, 1333–34 
(9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the enactment of 
Measure 49 did not violate plaintiffs’ property rights under the takings, due process, 
and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. 
 32. See Frug, supra note 24, at 6. 
 33. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 34. For a critique of the initiative and referenda in the context of local land use 
decision-making, as opposed to fiscal decision-making, see generally David L. Callies 
et al., Ballot Box Zoning: Initiative, Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. 
& CONTEMP. L. 53 (1991); Aaron J. Reber & Karin Mika, Democratic Excess in the 
Use of Zoning Referenda, 29 URB. LAW. 277 (1997); Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering 
the Use of Direct Democracy in Making Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 293 (2002).  
 35. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 783; see also Frug, supra note 24, at 7.  
For an example of an initiative that was supported by the private interests who stood 
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B. More Deliberative Methods of Grassroots Democracy Are 
Better Tools to Solve Municipal Fiscal Crises 
With the initiative and referendum unavailable in New York36 and 
in recognition of the shortcomings of the public hearing—the pre-
dominant method of public participation in town budgeting in New 
York,37 Salkin suggests other methods of participatory democracy or 
grassroots democracy as vehicles to engage the citizenry in fiscal 
problem solving.  These vehicles include the town meeting, participa-
tory budgeting, deliberative polling, consensus conferences, and citi-
zen juries.38  Each has been used in some local government process in 
either the United States or, in the case of participatory budgeting, 
Canada.39  It is worth exploring whether more deliberative or “talk 
centric” methods of engaging the citizenry in the fiscal problems fac-
ing government are preferable to the vote centric methods discussed 
and dismissed above. 
The New England town meeting is a romantic, nostalgic, Cinderella 
among proponents of democratic government.40 
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “Town meetings are to liberty what 
primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s 
reach, they teach men how to use and enjoy it.”  Lord Bryce de-
scribed the town meeting as “the most perfect school of self-
government in any modern country.”  And Thomas Jefferson con-
cluded that town meetings “have proved themselves the wisest in-
 
to benefit most, consider Oregon’s experience with Ballot Measure 37.  That initia-
tive required either payment of just compensation to landowners whose real property 
values were reduced as a result of land-use regulations, or, alternatively, a waiver of 
the regulations.  Timber interests in Oregon both worked for the passage of Measure 
37 and stood to benefit most from its passage.  In fact,  
[t]imber interests provided 44% of the overall funding to Measure 37.  Of 
the known Measure 37 claims filed, not one of the timber interests sought 
less than a 1,000% return on their dollar-for-dollar investment in the cam-
paign.  The contributor with the largest total claims, Stimson Lumber Com-
pany, gave $30,000 to the campaign and filed at least $269 million in Meas-
ure 37 claims.  
Sullivan & Brager, supra note 31, at 586–87. 
 36. About half the states have either initiative, referendum or both.  New York is 
not one of them. Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 755. 
 37. See id. at 756 & n.184 (citing a New York statute requiring a public meeting or 
hearing).   
 38. See id. at 755–83. 
 39. See id.  
 40. Town hall meetings are both deliberative and decision-making vehicles.      
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vention ever devised by the wit of man for the perfect exercise of 
self-government, and for its preservation.”41 
Alas, the town meeting has the same pitfalls as its ugly stepsisters, 
the initiative and referendum, in failing to produce comprehensive, 
participatory solutions to governance problems.  The town meeting 
not only fails to achieve better (or even different) solutions than 
those produced by representative democracy, it also fails to deliver 
fully on the promise of more citizen participation in decision-making.  
In Beyond Adversary Democracy, Jane J. Mansbridge exposes these 
failures of fully participatory democracy: 
In the late 1960s, every major American city and every rural area to 
which young people had migrated could claim a host of free schools, 
food co-ops, law communes, women’s centers, hot lines, and health 
clinics organized along “participatory” lines.  I had been a member 
of several such groups; in all of them, internal struggles over equality 
and elitism had left the groups in disarray.42   
Mansbridge’s research demonstrates that her personal experience was 
not unusual; town meetings fail to engage fair and equal representa-
tion in the same way that representative democracy fails to do so.43  
Some groups were more likely to attend than others, some expressed 
fear of facing others with whom they had disagreed, and some were 
intimidated and had not attended a town meeting in ten years.44  This 
led Mansbridge to conclude that New England town meetings are 
more hospitable to the interests of longtime residents45 and to older,46 
wealthy,47 male,48 and self-confident people who are normally en-
couraged to exhibit authority.49 
Salkin recognizes that citizen participation via the methods she de-
scribes is not alone a panacea for solving the fiscal problems facing 
local governments.  Any participatory process can lead to furtherance 
of the preferences of only a small number of participants.50  Because 
 
 41. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 41 (1980) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at vii. 
 43. See id. at 97.  
 44. See id. at 59–71 (describing author’s participation in town meetings in Ver-
mont as research for her book on adversary and unitary democracy). 
 45. See id. at 100–02. 
 46. See id. at 105. 
 47. See id. at 107–10. 
 48. See id. at 105–07. 
 49. See id. at 110–11. 
 50. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 763. 
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of this fact, one wonders whether more participatory democratic pro-
cesses yield any better solutions than those that would be produced as 
a result of representative democratic practices.  Mansbridge’s re-
search suggests that participatory, direct democratic processes do not 
lead to different or better solutions largely because the same actors 
achieve power and authority and are able to drive away newcomers, 
the weak, and the already underrepresented.51  Particularly in the par-
ticipatory budgeting process, Salkin notes that citizen participation 
can lead to too much focus on individual interests as opposed to the 
general public good.52 
Many commentators have noted the hazard of assuming that pro-
moting democratic participation at the local or sub-local level leads to 
more or different voices being heard.53  Like Mansfield’s research on 
the town hall meeting, which shows that participatory vehicles to in-
crease democratic participation do not lead to participation by broad-
er categories of underrepresented citizens, a study of Los Angeles 
neighborhood councils found that most are dominated by homeown-
ers, the well-educated, and well-off, older, white residents.54 
C. Randomly Selected Participants Improve Deliberative 
Democracy 
The failure of the town meeting to elicit diverse participation sug-
gests that the benefits of more and different voices associated with 
participatory democracy at the grassroots level may be best achieved 
when citizens are randomly chosen to participate rather than self-
selected for participation.  Some of the methods presented by Salkin 
can work in exactly that way.  Participatory budgeting processes used 
in Brazil55 and citizen assemblies in Canada56 called upon citizens who 
were randomly selected to learn about the fiscal problems facing the 
city and then make suggestions as to how to address those fiscal is-
sues. 
 
 51. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 41, at 62–63. 
 52. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 763.   
 53. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Goverance, 
82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (1997); Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financial-
ly Stressed Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 660–61 (2012); Shoked, supra 
note 22 (manuscript at 46). 
 54. See Shoked, supra note 22 (manuscript at 56) (citing Juliet Musso et al., Rep-
resenting Diversity in Community Governance, URBAN POLICY BRIEF (2004)). 
 55. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 761–62. 
 56. See id. at 764–66. 
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Combining randomly-selected citizen participation with education 
on the issues has the potential to be the most effective participatory 
process to achieve all the benefits of hearing from a wide selection of 
citizens: citizen buy-in that can result from participation, and better 
informed decisions.57  The deliberative polling process can marry ran-
dom selection of citizen participants with education to determine how 
the public would vote if the average citizen were well informed.58  
Thus, deliberative polling prevents the government from being 
“blindsided” by a surprising and inconsistent public decision at the 
polls.59 
Likewise, the citizen jury can bring together randomly selected citi-
zens to learn about and explore budget issues and make recommen-
dations for solutions while achieving the benefits of participation.  
Salkin’s Article describes the use of citizen juries in the Clinton Ad-
ministration to examine federal budgetary issues.60  One of the bene-
fits of the process is the citizenry’s new appreciation of the complexity 
of government budgeting decisions and increased respect for govern-
ment decision-makers.61  Paying the randomly selected participants in 
a town hall or citizen jury, just like a courtroom juror would be paid,62 
better affords poor and underrepresented citizens an equal oppor-
tunity to participate. 
Citizen jurors in the federal budgeting process decided to raise tax-
es to pay for programs they valued and to cut programs that have tra-
ditionally been protected from cuts by powerful lobbies in the repre-
sentative democratic process.  For example, the citizen jury voted to 
cut social security, agricultural subsidies, and the defense budget.63  In 
deciding to raise taxes, citizens were transformed by education and 
participation in the difficult decision-making and weighing process 
that is government budgeting.  This transformation surprised the citi-
zens themselves.  One jury member stated, “Coming into this thing, I 
never thought I’d make a choice to raise taxes.  But I decided to bite 
 
 57. See id. at 771–73 (noting that 89% of citizen participants in a California delib-
erative polling effort described it as “extremely valuable”). 
 58. See id. at 772. 
 59. See supra Part I. 
 60. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 777–79. 
 61. See id. at 777 (quoting one jury member who stated, “I’m a lot more aware of 
how hard it is and I have more respect for the people who have to do it.”). 
 62. But perhaps payment should be a little higher  given the extremely low 
amounts paid for jury duty in many jurisdictions.  
 63. See Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 1, at 778. 
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the bullet.  Our kids have to live with what we’ve done in this coun-
try.”64 
 
 64. Id. (quoting William Claiborne, Citizen Jury Demands Strong Action on 
Budget; Clinton Urged to ‘Make The Tough Choices’, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1993, at 
A12 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
